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DISABLING AMERICA: THE "RIGHTS INDUSTRY" 
IN OUR TIME. By Richard E. Morgan.t New York: Basic 
Books, Inc. 1984. Pp. 245. $16.95. 
TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: THE FRANCIS BOYER LECTURES ON PUBLIC 
POLICY. By Robert H. Bork.2 American Enterprise Insti-
tute for Public Policy Research. 1984. Pp. 11. $3.00. 
Carl Auerbach3 
Relatively few political scientists today specialize in questions 
of constitutional policy. With Judge Bork, I lament the fact that 
law, including constitutional law, "is an arena of ideas that is too 
often ignored by intellectuals interested in public policy."4 This is a 
pity because the interaction of these intellectuals and legal scholars 
would enrich the literature on law and public policy. Professor 
Richard E. Morgan's book is a notable and welcome addition to 
that literature. 
Professor Morgan was academically trained in "political phi-
losophy, constitutional law, and that stream of political science that 
deals with the interaction of organized groups in society."s In his 
capacity as a student of constitutional law, Professor Morgan de-
votes most of his book to a critical analysis of the major decisions 
dealing with religion, racial desegregation, due process in public 
schools, and affirmative action. Writing as a political philosopher, 
he disputes the legitimacy of the "noninterpretivist" mode of consti-
tutional adjudication that he holds responsible for these decisions. 
Though little he says is new, Morgan's criticism is lively, biting, and 
lucid. His special contribution is made in his third role, that of a 
student of "the interaction of organized groups in society." Morgan 
blames the "rights industry" for manufacturing new constitutional 
rights that disregard the claims of organized society. These new 
individual rights, he charges, have disabled America by isolating the 
churches from society, destabilizing the schools, enfeebling law en-
I. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Constitutional Law, Bowdoin College. 
2. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
3. Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
4. R. BoRK, TRADmON AND MORALITY IN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1·2 (1984). 
5. R. MORGAN, DISABLING AMERICA 4 (1984). 
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forcement, undermining public order and preempting private 
decisionmaking. 
This review will first consider Morgan's attack on the rights 
industry. It will then evaluate his attack Goined by Judge Bork) on 
noninterpretivism. Finally, it will suggest a significant contribution 
that social scientists like Morgan could make. 
I 
Morgan tries to tell us "who are these people"6 that constitute 
the "rights industry" and how they are responsible for the Supreme 
Court decisions having these bad effects. His answers are not satis-
fying. In general terms, Morgan describes the "rights industry" as 
a "set of specialized elites professionally concerned with" rights and 
liberties, including "interest group advocates, law professors, ac-
tivist lawyers and publicists," but mostly lawyers, who may be iden-
tified by their politics. 1 
In essence, Morgan charges that the "rights industry" is com-
posed of "idealists of the left" who "broadly" share ten political 
tenets he sets forth. These tenets demonstrate that they are "pro-
foundly" and "overwhelmingly" "disaffected from American cul-
ture and society," and "because of their disaffection ... feel free to 
lumber that society with new and expensive rights."s The only sup-
port Morgan gives for these assertions is a survey of 157 individuals 
who represent a cross section of the public interest elite, including 
leaders or top staffers of seventy-four organizations as well as major 
public interest law firms,9 and who, according to Morgan, overlap 
substantially with the "rights industry."w 
Morgan then specifically mentions only the ACLU, Center for 
Law and Social Policy, Children's Defense Fund ("a specialized and 
especially zany rights industry formation") and the Women's Legal 
Defense Fund. II Although civil rights groups, such as the NAACP 
6. Id. at 191. 
7. See id. at 6, 3, 199, 191, respectively. 
8. ld. at 192, 194-95. 
9. /d. at 196. The survey referred to is Lichter & Rothman, What Interests the Public 
and What Interests the Public Interests, PUB. OPINION, Apr.-May 1983, at 44. The quotation 
from the report of the survey is at 45. Professors Lichter and Rothman describe the 157 
leaders of the public interest groups and firms they surveyed as "overwhelmingly young, 
highly educated, well-paid professionals, with secular and liberal outlooks and democratic 
voting habits." Id. at 45. They see the public interest movement as "the purest political 
expression" of the "new liberalism" that remains concerned with "matters of economic privi-
lege and privation" but "centers on newer social, cultural, and 'life style' issues." /d. at 44. 
10. R. MoRGAN, supra note 5, at 196. 
II. /d. The characterization of the Children's Defense Fund is at p. 70. Professors 
Lichter and Rothman also mention that Common Cause, Congress Watch, Consumers' 
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and Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights were not included in the 
survey, Morgan does not think "this omission affects the results 
significantly. "12 
In other contexts, Morgan specifies other groups and individu-
als. In connection with the Supreme Court decisions on the religion 
clauses, the "rights industry" includes the ACLU, NAACP, Protes-
tants and Other Americans United for the Separation of Church 
and State, the American Jewish Congress, the General Conference 
of Seventh Day Adventists, the Order of United American Mechan-
ics, the National Education Association, Paul Blanshard (who ex-
pressed "the postwar anti-Catholicism of the American left"), Leo 
Pfeffer (the "archetypical rights professional"), R. Freeman Butts, 
V.T. Thayer, Alvin L. Johnson, Irving Brant and Joseph L. Blau. 
For the school busing cases, the "rights industry" includes not 
only the many private groups interested in civil rights that make up 
the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights but also the "rights in-
dustry professionals within the federal government," particularly 
the United States Civil Rights Commission.n Morgan also names 
certain law professors who "were aligned with the fabricators of the 
constitutional requirement of integration as partners in a common 
enterprise" - Owen M. Fiss, Ronald Dworkin, and David L. 
Kirp.l4 Still other groups are named as part of the "affirmative ac-
tion" sector of the rights industry - the National Committee on 
Pay Equity, National Organization of Women, the Women's Legal 
Defense Fund, and the Society of American Law Teachers.1s 
Other law professors are named as leaders of the rights indus-
try seeking to extend the constitutional rights of the accused -
Yale Kamisar (the "Leader of the Mirandists"), Anthony Amster-
dam (a "rights industry superstar") and Laurence H. Tribe ("the 
very model of an activist professor"). Though Morgan grants in a 
footnote that the law schools are not monolithic, he thinks "rights 
radicalism" dominates the law schools and that this has led to the 
"extensive interpenetration of legal education and the rights 
industry."J6 
Union, Critical Mass, Environmental Defense Fund, and Public Citizen were included in the 
public interest groups they surveyed. 
12. /d. 
13. See id. at 37, 39, 14, 32-41, 54-55, respectively. I assume Morgan would no longer 
describe the Civil Rights Commission in this fashion. Morgan holds "rights industry" profes-
sionals responsible for Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. _1 _(19_7~). 
"along with the law clerks of the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court and thetr judicial 
principals." R MORGAN, supra note 5, at 57. 
14. /d. at 58-60. 
15. Id. at 153, 154-55. 
16. Id. at 89, 115, 122, 165. 
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What does all this amount to? Morgan admits that the "rights 
industry" is not "centrally directed."J7 Indeed, the cast of culprits 
changes from constitutional issue to constitutional issue, though 
some characters may appear in a number of productions. What 
unites the groups and individuals named by Morgan is merely that 
they instigated litigation, filed briefs amici curiae, or wrote articles 
urging the courts to make decisions Morgan deplores.1s 
One may speak of an "antirights industry" in the same sense. 
And some groups, like the American Jewish Committee and the 
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith, are in the rights industry 
on some issues and the antirights industry on others. Nor is there 
any evidence that the antirights industry commands fewer legal and 
other resources than the rights industry. The contrary is probably 
the truth.J9 
Only the Supreme Court, not the rights industry, "manufac-
tures" rights, and the rights industry has not always been successful 
in its strivings. Morgan's analysis of the politics of the rights indus-
try does not help us to understand why the Supreme Court has re-
sponded to it, and not to the antirights industry, in the cases 
Morgan criticizes. Surely Morgan is not implying that the Justices 
responsible for these decisions are also "idealists of the left" who 
are profoundly disaffected from American society. This description 
also does not fit every group and individual Morgan includes in the 
"rights industry," however accurate it may be for some of them at 
one time or another.2o I find greater explanatory power in Profes-
17. /d. at 34. 
18. See id. at 3, 12, liS, 148. 
19. For example, in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947), the School Board of 
the Township of Ewing, as Morgan points out, supra note 5, at 14, was represented by the 
state (New Jersey) Attorney General's Office and a partner in Davis, Polk. In addition, six 
other states filed briefs supporting New Jersey and Ewing. /d. at 14. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), amici curiae briefs supporting affirmance of 
the convictions were filed on behalf of twenty-seven states, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, 
and the National District Attorneys Association. 
In United Steel Workers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), amici curiae briefs 
urging affirmance of the holding below that employment preferences based upon race violated 
Title VII's prohibition against racial discrimination in employment were filed by the Anti-
Defamation League of B'nai Brith, California Correctional Officers Association, Government 
Contract Employers Association, Pacific Legal Foundation, Polish American Congress, 
Southwestern Legal Foundation, and United States Justice Foundation. 
Amici curiae briefs in University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), 
urging affirmance of the California Supreme Court's decision that the special admissions pro-
gram of the Davis medical school was invalid under the equal protection clause were filed by 
the American Federation of Teachers, American Jewish Committee, American Subcontrac-
tors Association, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith, Fraternal Order of Police, Order of 
Sons of Italy, Pacific Legal Foundation, Queens Jewish Community Council, and Young 
Americans for Freedom. 
20. I think Morgan recognizes this. He acknowledges that the "civil libertarian enter-
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sor Nathan Glazer's insight that "the nature of the law itself em-
phasizes many themes that have become the essence of liberalism: 
due process, a careful consideration of rights, a system of reasoning 
by analogy, which permits moving from restricted conceptions of 
due process to more extended ones. "21 But I do not think even this 
is the whole story. Nor does Professor Glazer. 
II 
Morgan's indictment of "noninterpretivism" is a powerful one, 
which Judge Bork joins. Yet the positions taken by both reveal the 
difficulties of "interpretivism." 
Judge Bork believes "[w]e are entering ... a period in which 
our legal culture and constitutional law may be transformed, with 
even more power accruing to judges than is presently the case." He 
attributes this development to the "fact ... that the law [including 
constitutional law] possesses very little theory about itself," about 
"the sources of law, or its capacities and limits, or the prerequisites 
for its vitality." Consequently, legal scholars "are becoming in-
creasingly converted to an ideology of the Constitution that de-
mands . . . an infusion of extraconstitutional moral and political 
notions." "[N]ew theories of moral relativism and egalitarianism" 
dominate "constitutional thinking in a number of leading law 
schools." These theories "are increasingly abstract and philosophi-
cal; they are sometimes nihilistic; they always lack what law re-
quires, democratic legitimacy." Judges who are instructed they 
"may· properly reason to constitutional decisions" by applying "ab-
stractions of moral philosophy," rather than the "historical Consti-
tution," are "being educated to engage in really heroic adventures 
in policy making." When these abstractions fail to achieve desired 
results, constitutional "nihilism" nevertheless advocates the use of 
judicial power to produce them. Thus, "[c]onstitutional scholarship 
today is dominated by the creation of arguments that will encourage 
judges to thwart democractic choice." This scholarship, Judge 
Bork charges, conflicts with the views of the "majority of living 
Americans about where the balance between individual freedom 
prise" is important to America's development and its future, (supra note 5, at 6), the "rights 
industry" has an "honorable history of opposing and curbing" "serious abuses of public and 
private power in America" (id. at 213), "there is much that is admirable about the people and 
groups" he criticizes, (icl. at 214), and the disabling of major private and governmental insti-
tutions has been "largely unintended by them" (icl. at I). But he concludes that the "rights 
industry" in our time "needs to moderate and ideologically detoxify itself in order to serve 
effectively as guardian of the open society rather than its traducers." /d. at 214. 
21. Glazer, Lawyers, the New Class, and the Constitution, 2 CoNsr. CoMM. 27, 37 
(1985). 
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and social order lies. "22 
Like Judge Bork, I deplore the antimajoritarianism of much 
current constitutional scholarship. I wish we would curb our 
desires for immediate results and stop looking to the Supreme Court 
to act as an instrument of social change. But choosing between in-
terpretivism and noninterpretivism will do little to resolve disputes 
over the merits of particular opinions. 
Even if we possessed the most complete theory about law's 
sources, its capacities and limits and the prerequisites for its vitality 
(and I think Judge Bork underestimates how much of such theory 
we do have), we would still have to go to fields of learning outside 
the law in order to evaluate it. Indeed, legal scholars must resort to 
other intellectual disciplines to develop theories about law's capaci-
ties and limits and the prerequisites for its vitality. However one 
may value process, criteria for evaluating outcomes are also neces-
sary. The "law and economics" movement, for example, uses ab-
stract theory for this purpose, without apparent objection from 
Judge Bork. 
Judge Bork may not be as much troubled by the infusion of 
"extraconstitutional moral and political notions" into constitutional 
adjudication as by the infusion of particular notions he finds anath-
ema. For he quotes Richard John Neuhaus's statement that "[l]aw 
that is recognized as legitimate is . . . organically related to . . . 
the larger universe of moral discourse that helps share human be-
havior. In short, if law is not also a moral enterprise, it is without 
legitimacy or binding force."23 I find Neuhaus's statement unex-
ceptionable, but obviously the "larger universe of moral discourse" 
is "extraconstitutional." 
Judge Bork tries to reconcile Neuhaus's statement with his 
own views by insisting that in "a constitutional democracy the 
moral content of law must be given by the moraJity of the framer or 
the legislator, never by the morality of the judge. "24 Morgan 
agrees.2s 
Here lies the difficulty. Law and morals may conflict. Existing 
law may be immoral when judged by criteria supplied by the "larger 
universe of moral discourse." Take Griswold v. Connecticut,26 in 
which the Court rejected the morality of the legislator and invali-
dated a Connecticut statute making it a crime for married persons 
22. For the quoted language, see R. BoRK, supra note 4, at 2-3, 5-9. 
23. /d. at II. 
24. /d. 
25. R. MORGAN, supra note 5, at 177 (the morality that the law should enforce "is the 
legislatively ratified conventional morality"). 
26. 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
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to use contraceptives. The decision may have reflected the individ-
ual morality of each of the Justices in the majority. But is there any 
doubt that the Connecticut statute violated the standards of moral-
ity shared by the American people? To insist that the legislator's 
morality should govern in such a case would indeed divorce consti-
tutional law from the "larger universe of moral discourse."21 Inter-
pretivism offers no guide to the Justices in such a situation. 
Neither Judge Bork nor Professor Morgan are strict interpre-
tivists. Morgan "does not insist that the meaning of a constitutional 
provision is fixed forever by the immediate concerns of the framers 
or bound in hoops of steel by history." Unlike Raoul Berger, he 
justifies Brown v. Board of Education on interpretivist grounds. But 
his interpretivism allows only for "controlled innovation"; he insists 
that the Court must "create new constitutional rights by interpreta-
tion of the text or some known (or discoverable) tradition of prior 
understanding of what the text means." But what "successive gen-
erations took [particular] constitutional provisions to mean" may at 
successive times have involved innovation and new policymaking. 
Why should this process end with any particular generation?2s 
Judge Bork does not elaborate his views of "interpretivism." 
In this lecture, he says judges should govern according to the "his-
torical Constitution" and accept "the proposition that the framers' 
intentions with respect to freedoms are the sole legitimate premise 
from which constitutional analysis may proceed." But proceed it 
may, and so Judge Bork calls for "theory that relates the framers' 
values to today's world. "29 I find it impossible to see how such a 
theory can avoid resorting to fields of learning outside the law, or 
how judges may avoid the influence of their own moral values in 
developing and applying any such theory. The objective moral 
standards Americans share are not static. By their decisions, judges 
may draw moral issues into public discussion, and a new consensus 
may emerge. In any case, I do not find "interpretivism" or 
"noninterpretivism" as expounded by their respective adherents 
helpful in defining the scope and limits of constitutional policymak-
ing by judges in a democratic society. 
27. Nor is it quite fair for Judge Bork (supra note 4, at 3-4) to charge that Justice 
Harlan's opinion in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), reflects moral relativism. Justice 
Harlan appreciated the need for civility in political discourse in a democracy. Nevertheless, 
he held that the first amendment prohibited government from trying to enforce civility. See 
Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse, 1980 DUKE L.J. 283. I doubt that the objective standards 
of morality that Americans share would condemn Cohen's actions as "immoral," though 
many might well view it as offensively rude. 
28. R. MoRGAN, supra note 5, at 166-70. 
29. R. BoRK, supra note 4, at 7, 10. 
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III 
Disputes about the merits of the particular constitutional poli-
cies Morgan attacks may be clarified, if not resolved, by considering 
their social consequences. Morgan's major thesis is that these poli-
cies are disabling America by imposing monetary and other costs 
that render major American institutions "less able to pursue excel-
lence in performing their primary function."3o Yet he devotes rela-
tively few pages to proving his thesis. He presents little evidence 
that major American institutions are less effective than they used to 
be, let alone evidence on the extent to which the Court is to blame 
for any decrease in effectiveness. Morgan argues that it is "puerile" 
to "respond to an argument about a particular social cost with the 
defense of multivariant causality."3I But I am not suggesting that 
the fact of multivariant causality itself justifies the imposition by the 
Supreme Court of any additional social cost; only that a more in-
formed evaluation of the Court's decisions would be possible with 
data permitting a balance to be struck of their costs and benefits, 
including those that cannot be assessed quantitatively. 
Thus, for example, Morgan blames the decisions on the reli-
gion clauses for depriving the nation "of the option of enlisting 
church-related social service institutions (a large and richly exper-
ienced institutional sector) in implementing public programs"; and 
making "it difficult for government to act through private sector 
institutions at all," because "legislators are often unwilling to vote 
for programs utilizing private sector institutions if the church-re-
lated institutions, which loom large in their particular constituen-
cies must be left out."32 But other legislators may often be 
unwilling to vote for programs utilizing private sector institutions if 
church-related institutions must be included. And some legislators, 
as in Minnesota,33 may vote to aid nonparochial private schools 
only in order to aid parochial schools. Morgan gives us no basis for 
assessing the overall impact of these conflicting attitudes. 
To the constitutional constraints against financial aid, Morgan 
also attributes the possibility that private schools, including church 
schools, may go out of business.34 Yet some of these constitutional 
constraints, particularly the school prayer and Bible reading cases, 
may have resulted in an expansion of the parochial school system, 
even among Protestant groups. Again, Morgan gives no basis for 
30. R. MORGAN, supra note 5, at 7. 
31. /d. at 9. 
32. /d. at 41. 
33. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983). 
34. R. MORGAN, supra note 5, at 42. 
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assessing these conflicting possibilities, let alone the social costs of 
separating children by religion during their most formative years. 
Morgan asserts that few positive educational benefits have re-
sulted from "heroic integration measures" and holds the Supreme 
Court decisions requiring busing responsible for the "ravages of 
white flight and resegregation of the school systems of larger cities 
(and many middle sized cities)."Js Here he relies upon the work of 
David J. Armor and Nancy St. John.36 
In fact, social scientists disagree as to the effects of school inte-
gration and mandatory busing. Morgan does not independently 
evaluate the work that has been done but simply accepts that which 
supports his contentions.37 
To the "wrong headed and sometimes vindictive pursuit of ra-
cial balance and the utopian conception of children's rights" Mor-
gan attributes, in significant measure, the "erosion of the moral 
authority of teachers, administrators and parents" which, in tum, 
accounts for the "disappointing contemporary performance of 
American public education."Js No evidence is presented concern-
ing the erosion of moral authority or the extent to which the 
Supreme Court decisions are responsible therefor. The factors that 
may account for the inadequacies of public education are indeed 
multiple. Morgan acknowledges some ofthem-"[t]rendy egalitari-
anism, abandonment of the fundamental subjects in pursuit of fash-
ionable ephemera, and the inferior educations received by so many 
teachers in their universities."39 Other factors may be equally im-
portant-such as the social and psychological problems children 
suffer (including depression and lack of concentration) because of 
hunger, poverty, divorce, abuse, and drugs.40 What is the weight of 
the Supreme Court's decisions on procedural due process in the 
35. /d. at 60. 
36. Armor, The Evidence on Busing, PUB. INTERESf, Summer 1972, at 90; The Double 
Standard: A Reply, PUB. INTERESf, Winter 1973, at 119; N. ST. JOHN, ScHOOL DESEGRE-
GATION: OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN (1975); The Effects of School Desegregation on Chil-
dren: aRe-Review of Research Evidence (October 1977) (paper presented to the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences Study Group on Urban School Desegregation). 
37. The various studies that had been done up to 1978 are cited in Yudof, School Deseg-
regation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme 
Court, 42 L. & CoNTEMP. PROB., particularly at 57, 61-63, 59 n.l4, 61-62 n.27-33 (1978). 
See also Hawley, The New Mythology of School Desegregation, 42 L. & CoNTEMP. PROB. 214, 
228 (1978). As "the most thorough and careful pro-busing response," Morgan cites G. 
0RFIELD, MuST WE Bus? (1978), with the con:ment that he will"leave it to the judgment of 
anyone up to Orfield's 450 pages to judge how well his arguments stand up six years later." 
R. MoRGAN, supra note 5, at 221 n.35. 
38. R. MoRGAN, supra note 5, at 73. 
39. /d. 
40. See generally The Human Factor: A Key to Excellence in Education, 1985 Report of 
the National Association of Social Workers. 
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public schools in the midst of all these factors? How shall we assess 
the benefits these decisions confer? 
The same difficulties reappear in Morgan's discussion of the 
Supreme Court decisions that he maintains have enfeebled law en-
forcement and the maintenance of public order. He recognizes that 
[b ]asic social factors such as the size of the youth cohort relative to the rest of the 
population, rural to urban migrations, and the extent to which nongovernmental 
institutions (families, churches and neighborhood groups) operate effectively and 
self-confidently on the basis of an accepted morality to discourage deviance, have 
greater impact on crime rates than the numbers of police, their level of professional-
ism, or whether judges are tough or permissive.41 
Nevertheless, although "we do not have high levels of crime and 
disorder because law enforcement is weak," weak law enforcement 
"will leave the community both psychologically and physically vul-
nerable to a degree beyond that decreed by demographic, economic, 
and social forces over which we (properly) have little control" and 
"ultimately corrode the bonds of trust between people and 
government. "42 
One may agree with everything Morgan says about the great 
value of the "marginal benefits" to be derived from improved law 
enforcement. Yet questions would remain whether the Supreme 
Court has in fact weakened law enforcement and handicapped the 
maintenance of public order; and, if so, to what extent, and, finally, 
whether that is a reasonable price to pay for the benefits that accrue 
from expanding the constitutional rights of the accused. On these 
questions, Morgan proffers no evidence. 
What I ask for may tax the capacities of social scientists, par-
ticularly if they are expected to help the Supreme Court make par-
ticular decisions. More can be expected of them in assessing the 
consequences of these decisions. The task will be more manageable 
if more social scientists become interested in the legal order and its 
role in the larger social order. Only by undertaking this task can 
social scientists make a special contribution to the illumination of 
constitutional policy making. 
41. R. MORGAN, supra note 5, at 74-75. 
42. /d. at 75-96. 
